The Indiana Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s denial of an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss filed by a truck driver and trucking company in a semi-truck accident case involving a truck driver’s failure to warn another truck driver of a disabled vehicle in the roadway that both truck drivers ultimately collided with on eastbound I-94. In NFI Interactive Logistics LLC v. Bruski, on an early morning in December 2019, truck driver D’Andre Terry (“Terry”), driving a semi-truck for NFI Interactive Logistics LLC (“NFI”), struck a disabled vehicle on an unlit portion of I-94, after which his semi-truck came to a controlled stop on the right shoulder, with the disabled vehicle remaining in the roadway. After the crash, Terry did not activate his hazard warning signal flashers or place hazard warning triangles or flares. Around ten minutes later, James Bruski (“Bruski”), who was also driving a semi-truck, crashed into the same disabled vehicle, causing his semi to strike and roll over a concrete barrier wall, resulting in injuries. Bruski and his wife filed a lawsuit against Terry and NFI (the “Defendants”) claiming Terry was negligent for failing to warn oncoming motorists of the disabled vehicle, including a claim that Terry was negligent per se for failing to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) incorporated under Indiana law that require drivers of commercial motor vehicles to take certain actions when stopped on the shoulder of a highway.
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Bruski’s complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support, the Defendants argued, among other things, that Terry’s vehicle was not involved in the crash between Bruski’s vehicle and the disabled vehicle, Terry had no duty to warn Bruski of the disabled vehicle, which did not change from its position blocking the same lanes of traffic after Terry hit it, and the FMCSR were not applicable as they were designed to protect motorists from stopped commercial motor vehicles, not other roadway hazards. In response, Bruski argued Terry engaged in “misconduct” by not providing warning, including failing to comply with the FMCSR and Terry contributed to the hazard of the disabled vehicle when Terry struck and moved it. At the hearing, Defendants’ counsel argued, “How is Terry at fault for a collision involving a guy who wrecked himself and a plaintiff who hit the guy that wrecked himself?” Ultimately, the trial court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the Defendants appealed.
On appeal the Indiana Court of Appeals analyzed the two potentially applicable theories of liability, a common law duty to warn and negligence per se. The Court noted that while motorists have a general duty to exercise reasonable care with respect to other motorists, they generally do not have any duty to aid or protect other persons, even if they know another person needs assistance. However, there are exceptions to this general rule under both the common law and by statute.
Bruski argued Terry contributed to the roadway hazard giving rise to a common law duty to give an adequate warning as part of Terry’s general duty to exercise reasonable care. Both parties directed the Court to caselaw and Restatement provisions, with Defendants arguing that a duty to warn arises only when one created the hazard or has control of the hazard, that is, there is no common law duty to warn when one only contributes to an existing hazard, especially when one was not negligent in contributing to the hazard. Bruski on the other hand argued that contributing to a hazard when one knows or should know that it presents an unreasonable risk of harm gives rise to liability, that is, Terry had a duty to warn because even if Terry hitting the disabled vehicle was not negligent, the consequence of that act created an unreasonable risk of harm to Bruski with the disabled vehicle moved further into the roadway where Bruski was driving.
Ultimately, as to a common law duty to warn, the Indiana Court of Appeals sided with Bruski. The Court found persuasive a case from the Tennessee Supreme Court, which found motorists have a common law duty to warn other motorists of highway obstructions to which they contributed, regardless of whether their contributions were negligent and regardless of whether other persons have a similar duty to warn. While Bruski’s complaint did not specifically allege that the crash between Terry and the disabled vehicle moved the disabled vehicle so as to increase the hazard of the disabled vehicle (e.g., that the first crash moved the disabled vehicle into two lanes of traffic as opposed to just one), the Court found the facts alleged in Bruski’s complaint sufficiently pled a viable theory under Indiana’s notice pleading that Terry contributed to the hazard and therefore had a common law duty to warn.
Bruski also argued that Terry was negligent per se by failing to comply with the FMCSR, 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a) and (b), which require activation of hazard warning signal flashers and placement of warning devices when a commercial motor vehicle stops on the highway or on the shoulder of a highway for any reason other than necessary traffic stops. Negligence per se provides a statutory standard of care when the statute was designed to protect (1) the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included and (2) the type of harm that has occurred because of the violation. Defendants argued the provisions of the FMCSR at issue were designed to protect against collisions with commercial motor vehicles, not other roadway hazards, and therefore Terry could not be found negligent per se. The Indiana Court of Appeals, however, noted that a stated purpose of the FMCSR is to ensure that commercial motor vehicles are operated safely, with the Court finding the provisions of the FMCSR at issue protect both operators of commercial motor vehicles and other motorists and the required warnings alert motorists to, not only stopped commercial motor vehicles, but also the area around stopped commercial motor vehicles, which might include hazards that resulted in a commercial motor vehicle stopping, such as a blown tire or debris in the roadway. As such, the Court concluded Bruski was within the class of persons protected by the FMCSR and the regulations were designed to protect the type of collision in this case.
The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that Bruski’s complaint stated viable theories based upon (1) Terry’s alleged failure to warn after potentially contributing to a road hazard and (2) Terry’s failure to comply with the FMCSR. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and remanded the case.
You can read the full opinion here.